Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self-identification, philosophy: here we are concerned with the conditions for the ability of a thinking subject to distinguish itself from other subjects or objects in order to relate to itself with language, gestures, and actions. See also private language, privileged access, identification, individuation, introspection, self, I, self-attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Tyler Burge on Self- Identification - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 696 Self-Identification/Burge: here you individuate your thoughts in such a way that you know them as tokens and as types of thoughts. We know which thoughts we think. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Twin Earth: Problem: But how can we individualize our own thoughts if we have not yet distinguished the right empirical conditions from the wrong empirical conditions? It is clear that we must presuppose the conditions for the thinking of a certain thought in the thinking of that thought! Some of them can only be recognized empirically. Example: to think of something as water, one must have a causal relationship to water. >Twin earth. Example: but to think that water is a liquid, we do not need that relationship! Here the (complex) conditions only have to be assumed. Frank I 697 Self-Identification/Burge: Knowledge of one's own thoughts is second level thinking. But the first thought is not merely an object; self-identification takes place in the same act. Therefore the conditions are the same for both. Again, one does not need to know the enabling conditions! It is enough to know that they are fulfilled. Both empirical and reflective thoughts presuppose conditions that determine their content. In both cases some of them can only be recognized empirically. Why does it not follow that one cannot know that one thinks that "this and that" is the case unless one undertakes an empirical investigation that shows that the conditions that "this and that" is the case are fulfilled? The answer is entangled, it has to do with the fact that you have to "start somewhere". Frank I 700 Self-Identification/perceptional knowledge/Burge: so far we have highlighted the similarities. But there are also differences: Self-Identification: here the demand for a distinction of twin-earth-thoughts is even more absurd than with perceptual thoughts. Frank I 702 Self-Identification/Burge: differs in these two aspects a) and b) from perceptual knowledge: if you are wrong about self-identification, it shows that there is something wrong with you (as opposed to wrong perception). Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Burge
> Counter arguments in relation to Self- Identification
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28